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The assignment game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is the cooperative viewpoint
of a two-sided market. There are two sides of the market, i.e. two disjoint sets
of agents, buyers and sellers, who can trade. The profits are collected in a matrix,
the assignment matrix. The allocation of the optimal profit should be such that no
coalition has incentives to depart from the grand coalition and act on its own. In
doing so, a first game-theoretical analysis of cooperation focuses on the core of the
game. Shapley and Shubik show that the core of any assignment game is always
nonempty. It coincides with the set of solutions of the linear program, dual to the
classical optimal assignment problem. A recent survey on assignment games is
Núñez and Rafels (2015).
Among other solutions, the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a “fair” solution
in the general context of cooperative games. It is a unique core-selection that
lexicographically minimizes the excesses1 arranged in a nondecreasing way. The
standard procedure for computing the nucleolus proceeds by solving a finite (but
large) number of related linear programs. As a solution concept, the nucleolus has
been analyzed and computed in many cooperative games. Solymosi and Raghavan
(1994) gives an algorithm for the computation of the nucleolus of the assignment
game, computed in polynomial time. Recently Martı́nez-de-Albéniz et al. (2013b)
provides a new procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game. An
interesting survey on the nucleolus and its computational complexity is given in
Greco et al. (2015).
From a geometric point of view, Llerena and Núñez (2011) have characterized
the nucleolus of a square assignment game, essential for our purposes. To illustrate
1 Given a coalition S ⊆ N, and an allocation x ∈ RN the excess of a coalition is defined as
e(S,x) := v(S)−∑i∈S xi. Notice they can be considered as complaints.
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There are 2 buyers (rows) and 2 sellers (columns). The worth to share is 12, ob-
tained by pairing both sides on the main diagonal. Its nucleolus is (4,2;4,2) ∈





which has also the same nucleolus. To see it we draw the core2 of the associated
assignment games and their nucleolus. We depict the projection on the buyers’
(first) coordinates of the core of both games in Figure 1. The core of the first one
C(wB) is in dark shading, vertices B1,B2,B3 and B4, and the second one C(wC) in
light shading, vertices C1,C2,C3,C4 and C5.
From Llerena and Núñez (2011) the nucleolus of matrix B is the unique core
point N such that the distances over some segments to the core’s walls are equal:
A′N = NB′,C′N = ND′ and EN = NF . Notice that for matrix C the analogous
equalities are AN = NB,CN = ND and EN = NF .
From the above geometric illustration we may expect large sets of assignment
matrices sharing a given vector as their nucleolus.
In this paper we focus on the structure the family of assignment matrices that
give rise to the same nucleolus. The main contributions of the paper are the fol-
lowing:
• The family of matrices with the same nucleolus forms a join-semilattice, i.e.
2 The core is defined later in (1) and (2).
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Figure 1: Two cores with the same nucleolus, (4,2;4,2).
closed by entry-wise maximum. The family has a unique maximum element
which is always a valuation matrix (Section 4).
• We show that the above family is a path-connected set and give a precise
path, connecting any matrix of the family with its maximum element. We
also study the cardinality of the family (Section 6).
• The inverse problem is also analyzed and studied, i.e. conditions on a vector
to be the nucleolus of some assignment game (Section 7).
2. Preliminaries on the assignment game
An assignment market (M,M′,A) is defined to be two disjoint finite sets: M the
set of buyers and M′ the set of sellers, and a nonnegative matrix A = (ai j)i∈M, j∈M′
which represents the profit obtained by each mixed-pair (i, j) ∈M×M′. To distin-
guish the j-th seller from the j-th buyer we will write the former as j′ when needed.
The assignment market is called square whenever |M| = |M′| . Usually we denote
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by m = |M| and m′ = |M′| . M+m denotes the set of nonnegative square matrices with
m rows and columns, and M+m×m′ the set of nonnegative matrices with m rows and
m′ columns.
Recall that M+m×m′ forms a lattice with the usual ordering ≤ between matrices.
The maximum C = A∨B of two matrices A,B ∈M+m×m′ is defined entry-wise, i.e.
as ci j = max{ai j,bi j} for all (i, j) ∈M×M′. Given an ordered subset of matrices
(F ,≤) ,F ⊆ M+m×m′ , we say matrix C ∈ F is a maximal (minimal) element of
(F ,≤) if whenever there is a matrix D ∈F with D ≥ (≤)C, then D =C. Matrix
C ∈F is a maximum element of (F ,≤) if C ≥ D for all D ∈F .
A matching µ ⊆M×M′ between M and M′ is a bijection from M0⊆M to M′0⊆
M′ with |M0|= |M′0|= min{|M| , |M′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ as well as j = µ (i) or
i = µ−1 ( j). If for some buyer i ∈M there is no seller j ∈M′ satisfying (i, j) ∈ µ
we say buyer i is unmatched by µ and similarly for sellers. The set of all matchings
from M to M′ is represented by M (M,M′) . A matching µ ∈M (M,M′) is optimal
for (M,M′,A) if ∑(i, j)∈µ ai j ≥ ∑(i, j)∈µ ′ ai j for any µ ′ ∈M (M,M′) . We denote by
M ∗A (M,M
′) the set of all optimal matchings.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate any assignment market with a game in
coalitional form (M∪M′,wA) called the assignment game in which the worth of a
coalition S∪T ⊆M∪M′ with S⊆M and T ⊆M′ is wA (S∪T )= max
µ∈M (S,T )
∑(i, j)∈µ ai j,
and any coalition formed only by buyers or sellers has a worth of zero.
The main goal is to allocate the total worth among the agents, and a prominent
solution for cooperative games is the core. Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that
the core of the assignment game is always nonempty. Given an optimal matching
µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) , the core of the assignment game, C(wA), can be easily described
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as the set of nonnegative payoff vectors (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ satisfying
xi + y j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (1)
xi + y j ≥ ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, (2)
and all agents unmatched by µ get a null payoff.
Now we define the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) of an assignment game, tak-
ing into account that its core is always nonempty. The excess of a coalition /0 6=
R ⊆M∪M′ with respect to an allocation in the core, (x,y) ∈C(wA), is defined as
e(R,(x,y)) := wA (R)−∑i∈R∩M xi−∑ j∈R∩M′ y j. By the bilateral nature of the mar-
ket, it is known that the only coalitions that matter are the individual and mixed-pair
ones (Núñez, 2004). Given an allocation (x,y) ∈C(wA), define the excess vector
θ (x,y) = (θk)k=1,...,r as the vector of individual and mixed-pair coalitions excesses
arranged in a non-increasing order, i.e. θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ . . . ≥ θr. Then the nucleolus of
the game (M∪M′,wA) is the unique core allocation ν (wA) ∈C(wA) which mini-
mizes θ (x,y) with respect to the lexicographic order3 over the whole set of core
allocations. For ease of notation we will use, for A ∈ M+m×m′ , ν (A) instead of
ν (wA) if no confusion arises.
We use the characterization of the nucleolus of a square assignment game of
Llerena and Núñez (2011), see also Llerena et al. (2015). To introduce this char-
acterization we define the maximum transfer from a coalition to another coalition.
Given any square assignment game (M∪M′,wA) , and two arbitrary coalitions
3 The lexicographic order ≥lex on Rd is defined in the following way: x≥lex y, where x,y ∈ Rd ,
if x = y or if there exists 1≤ t ≤ d such that xk = yk for all 1≤ k < t and xt > yt .
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/0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ we define
δ
A
S,T (x,y) := min
i∈S, j∈M′\T
{





T,S (x,y) := min
j∈T,i∈M\S
{
y j,xi + y j−ai j
}
,
for any core allocation (x,y) ∈C (wA).
Llerena and Núñez (2011) gives a geometric characterization of the nucleolus
of a square assignment game. They prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment
game is characterized as the unique core allocation (x,y) ∈C(wA) such that
δ
A
S,T (x,y) = δ
A
T,S (x,y) (3)
for any /0 6= S ⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |. In certain cases, the number of
equalities can be reduced. Indeed, note that if T 6= µ(S) for some µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) ,
then it holds δ AS,T (x,y) = δ
A
T,S (x,y) = 0. Therefore, for this characterization we
only have to check (3) for the cases T = µ(S) for some optimal matching µ ∈
M ∗A (M,M
′) and any /0 6= S⊆M, i.e.
δ
A
S,µ(S) (x,y) = δ
A
µ(S),S (x,y) , for any /0 6= S⊆M. (4)
To analyze the non-square case we can use two different approaches and we
will apply any of them.
The first and classical approach consists in adding null rows or columns in
order to make the initial matrix square. The added rows or columns correspond to
dummy agents and they receive a null payoff at any core allocation and hence also
in the nucleolus. At this extended square assignment matrix we apply the previous
geometric characterization. Notice that the number of coalitions to be checked
grows quickly for each added agent.
To fix our first approach we introduce some notation. Given any arbitrary as-
signment matrix A∈M+m×m′ , with m<m
′ and where µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)}
8
is an optimal matching for A, we define the following square matrix A0 ∈ M+m′
obtained from the original matrix A by adding m′−m zero rows, that is m′−m








 ai j if (i, j) ∈M×M′,0 if (i, j) ∈ (M0\M)×M′. (5)
We know that the matching µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal for matrix
A0.
The second approach keeps the dimension of the problem as low as we can
and it has an interest on its own. Basically it consists in reducing the assignment
problem to an appropriate square matrix, dropping out those agents unassigned by
an optimal matching, and reassessing the matrix entries. Apart from the dimension
issue, the main feature of this approach is that we must not care about the added
zero rows or columns when we deal with the matrix.
To introduce the second approach we need some notations. Let (M,M′,A) ,A∈
M+m×m′ be a non-square assignment market with m < m
′ and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′)












for each buyer i ∈M, (6)
and define the square matrix Aµ ∈M+m by




, for (i, j) ∈M×µ (M) . (7)
Then the relationship between their nucleolus is the following one:
νi(A) = νi(Aµ)+a
µ
i , for i ∈M, (8)
ν j(A) =
 ν j(Aµ) for j ∈ µ(M), and0 for j ∈M′\µ (M) . (9)
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Moreover the fixed matching µ is also optimal for matrix Aµ . A proof of these facts
is included in the Appendix.
3. A numerical example
The nucleolus of an assignment game is a geometrical half-way point of a
nonempty compact polyhedron, its core. From its description we can conceive its
invariance from synchronizing displacements of the core “walls”. In other words,
the effects of raising or lowering some appropriate entries of the assignment ma-
trix do not change the nucleolus. Our main objective is to analyze the family of
assignment matrices that give rise to the same nucleolus. We illustrate our purpose
by a 2×2 numerical example.





Notice that it has two optimal matchings and wA(M∪M′) = 12. To draw its core
we fix an optimal matching. Let us take µ1 = {(1,1),(2,2)} and we depict the
projection of the core on the buyers’ coordinates (see Figure 2). The core is given
by the segment A1A2. Its nucleolus is ν(A) = (4,2;4,2), since it is its midpoint.
Just by looking the geometric interpretation of the nucleolus N, it is easy to
see that matrices At =
 8 6− t
6− t 4
 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 4 share the same nucleolus
ν = (4,2;4,2) since the “distances” to the walls of the core are equal: A′N =
NB′,C′N = ND′ and A1N = NA2.
After t = 4 the walls can be moved independently, which adds matrices A = 8 a12
a21 4
 . for a12,a21 ∈ [0,2] to the family of matrices with the same nucle-
olus we are dealing with.
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for 0≤ t ≤ 4 with the same nucleolus, (4,2;4,2).
We have just described the family of matrices with the same nucleolus ν(A)
when we fix matching µ1. See L1∪L2 in Figure 3.






































To obtain the whole family of matrices with nucleolus ν(A) we have to repeat
the above argument fixing in matrix A the optimal matching µ2 = {(1,2),(2,1)}.
This process adds matrices L3∪L4 in Figure 4. Notice that M represents the same
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matrix A in Figures 3 and 4. Matrices B and C from the Introduction correspond
to points M1 and M2 in Figure 3.
From the previous Example 3.1 we can discuss the structure of the family
which will be analyzed in the next sections. Firstly, this family of assignment
matrices with the same nucleolus is composed of branches that share a unique
maximal element, its maximum, which is matrix A. This family is not a convex
set but path-connected. Finally in this case there is no minimum, but two minimal
elements.
4. Assignment games with the same nucleolus
We introduce the family of matrices with a given nucleolus. To this end, for an
arbitrary assignment matrix A ∈M+m×m′ we denote by
[A]ν :=
{
B ∈M+m×m′ | ν (B) = ν (A)
}
the family of matrices that share the same nucleolus than A.
It is clear that matrices with the same nucleolus must have the same worth for
the grand coalition even if they do not have any optimal matching in common, see
Example 3.1.
We focus now on the structure of this family: it is a nonempty compact join-
semilattice4 with a unique maximal element. Secondly we characterize this maxi-
mum and show it is a specific type of assignment matrix, a valuation matrix.
Theorem 4.1. Let A ∈M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix. The family [A]ν forms a
compact join-semilattice with a unique maximal element.
4 A family F ⊆M+m×m′ is a join-semilattice if A∨B ∈F for all A,B ∈F .
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Proof. First we prove that this family is a join-semilattice. Let B,B′ ∈ [A]ν . If
m 6= m′, we add zero rows or columns to make the matrices square, recall (5). It
is known that these rows or columns correspond to dummy players which obtain
zero payoff at any core allocation, and also in the nucleolus. Therefore we can
assume from now on that matrices are square. We have B,B′ ≤ B∨B′, and also
C(wB)∩C(wB′) 6= /0, since both games share the nucleolus. We claim
C(wB)∩C(wB′) =C(wB∨B′).
To see it, take any (x,y) ∈C(wB)∩C(wB′). It is clear xi +y j ≥max{bi j,b′i j} for all
(i, j) ∈M×M′. Then for any optimal matching µ of matrix B∨B′ we have
wB∨B′(M∪M′)= ∑
(i, j)∈µ
max{bi j,b′i j}≤ ∑
(i, j)∈µ
[xi+y j] =wB(M∪M′)=wB′(M∪M′).
As a consequence wB∨B′(M∪M′) = wB(M∪M′) = wB′(M∪M′). Now it is easy to
see (x,y) ∈C(wB∨B′). The other inclusion is straightforward.
Now to see ν (B) = ν (B′) = (x,y) is the nucleolus of wB∨B′ , just note that, for
all /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆M′ with |S|= |T |,
δ
B∨B′




















As a consequence, since (x,y) is the nucleolus of wB and wB′ , we obtain the equality
δ B∨B
′
S,T (x,y) = δ
B∨B′
T,S (x,y) , proving that B∨B′ ∈ [A]ν .
Now we show that this family is a compact set, and therefore with a unique
maximal element. We show that it is bounded and closed. It is bounded since
0≤ bi j ≤ xi+y j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ and B ∈ [A]ν with ν(A) = (x,y). It is closed
because the functions δ BS,T (x,y) and δ
B
T,S (x,y) are continuous in B ∈M
+
m×m′ for all
/0 6= S⊆M, /0 6= T ⊆M′ and |S|= |T | , and they must satisfy equalities (3).
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In contrast with the previous result, the minimum defined entry-wise of two
matrices with the same nucleolus may not have the same nucleolus, see Example
3.1.
Now we introduce a kind of assignment matrices, useful for our purposes. A
matrix A ∈M+m×m′ is a valuation matrix
5 if for any i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j1, j2 ∈
{1, . . . ,m′} we have ai1 j1 +ai2 j2 = ai1 j2 +ai2 j1 . Clearly this definition is equivalent
to see that any 2×2 submatrix has two optimal matchings.
Obviously, any fully-optimal6 square matrix is a valuation matrix, and for
square matrices the converse also holds. This characterization fails for non-square
matrices as the following matrix shows:
D =

3 6 8 1 0
4 7 9 2 1
6 9 11 4 3
 . (10)
This is a valuation matrix, but clearly not all matchings are optimal.
Finally we want to point out two general properties for non-square valuation
matrices. Let A ∈ M+m×m′ be an non-square valuation matrix with m < m
′ and
µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) any optimal matching, Then:
(i) The square submatrix AM×µ(M) is fully-optimal. Its worth is wA(M∪M′).
(ii) The entries of matrix A satisfy ai j1 ≥ ai j2 for all i ∈M, j1 ∈ µ(M) and j2 ∈
M′ \µ(M).
Theorem 4.2. Let A ∈M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix. The maximal element of
the family [A]ν is a valuation matrix. In the square case, m = m′, the maximal
element is the unique valuation matrix of the family.
5 Following Topkis (1998), a function is a valuation if it is submodular and supermodular.





Proof. Let ν(A) = (x,y)∈RM+×RM
′
+ be the nucleolus of matrix A∈M+m×m′ , where
we assume without loss of generality that m≤m′ and µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)}
is an optimal matching for A.
Define now matrix A ∈M+m×m′ as follows
ai j =









(i) ai j ≥ 0, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′,
(ii) A ∈ [A]ν , i.e. ν(A) = ν(A),
(iii) A is the maximum of the family [A]ν , and clearly a valuation matrix.
To prove claim (i), let A0,M0, and µ0 the notation introduced in (5) to make square






+ the vector defined by x
0
k =









and then δ A
0
M,µ0(M)(x






















{xi} if m = m′,
min
i∈M, j∈M′\µ(M)
{xi−ai j} if m < m′.
where we have used that y0j = y j = 0 for j ∈M′ \ µ(M) and x0i = xi ≥ xi− ai j for
i ∈M and j ∈M′ \µ(M).
From the above equality we easily deduce xi ≥ min
j∈µ(M)
{y j} for i ∈ M which
proves our first claim.
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We prove claim (ii), ν(A) = (x,y), by proving its equivalent form, ν((A)0) =
(x0,y0). Notice that µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal for matrix (A)0. To
prove ν((A)0) = (x0,y0), we distinguish several cases depending on an arbitrary
coalition S⊆M0,S 6= /0 :
Case 1: S∩ (M0 \M) 6= /0. We obtain δ (A)
0
S,µ0(S)(x




0, since x0i = 0 for all i ∈ S∩ (M0 \M) for the first equality and there exists j ∈
µ0(S)∩ (M′ \µ(M)), which implies y j = 0 for the second.
Case 2: S ⊆ M,S 6= M. We obtain δ (A)
0
S,µ0(S)(x
0,y0) = 0, since there exists j ∈



































{y j}, if m < m′.
Now, for m < m′ they trivially coincide and for m = m′, the square case, they
coincide since ν(A) = (x,y), and then δ AM,µ(M)(x,y) = mini∈M




Therefore, we have proved the second claim.
To prove claim (iii), let B ∈ [A]ν be an arbitrary matrix of the family. We can
assume that µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is optimal for matrix B, since in other
case, we consider matrix B∨A as a new matrix B, see Theorem 4.1 and notice
B≤ B∨A. Recall ν(B) = ν(A) = (x,y). Clearly ai j = xi+y j ≥ bi j for 1≤ i, j≤m.
If m = m′ we are done, and B≤ A. Otherwise, m < m′. Consider matrix B0, see
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{x0i ,x0i + y0j −b0i j}= min
i∈M, j∈M′\µ(M)
{xi−bi j}.
We obtain for all i ∈ M and j ∈ M′ \ µ(M), xi− bi j ≥ min
i∈M, j∈M′\µ(M)
{xi− bi j} =
min
j∈µ(M)
{y j}, or equivalently
ai j = xi− min
j∈µ(M)
{y j} ≥ bi j for all i ∈M, j ∈M′ \µ(M).
This ends our third claim, and proves the maximality of matrix A since we have
seen that in the non-square case, B≤ A.
The fact that A is a valuation matrix is left to the reader. Moreover in the square
case any valuation matrix of the family (with the same nucleolus) is fully-optimal,
and then it must coincide with matrix A.
From the statement of Theorem 4.2 we expect several valuation matrices if
the initial assignment matrix is not square. In (10) we have introduced matrix D ∈
M+3×5 which is an example of such a situation. By (4), (8) and (9) it is easy to check
that the nucleolus of matrix D is ν(D) = (2,3,5;1,4,6,0,0) and the maximum
matrix of [D]ν is given by the valuation matrix
D =

3 6 8 1 1
4 7 9 2 2
6 9 11 4 4
 ,
which is strictly greater than the valuation matrix D. Both valuation matrices share
the same nucleolus.
In the proof of Theorem 4.2 we have found the expression of the maximum
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element of family [A]ν , with ν(A) = (x,y). It is matrix A ∈M+m×m′ as follows
ai j =







for (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \µ(M)),
(11)
where µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) is an optimal matching. A close look at (11) could raise
expectations of different maximum matrices A depending on the chosen optimal
matching µ, but this is not the case, as the reader can check.
5. The 2×2 case
As an application of the above results we reveal how to describe the whole
family [A]ν , when we deal with 2×2 assignment matrices.





From now on and without loss of generality, we assume the following normal-
ization conditions:
a11 +a22 ≥ a12 +a21,
a11 ≥ a22, a12 ≥ a21. (12)
These conditions mean that the main diagonal of matrix A is an optimal matching
and it is sorted from highest to lowest. Sectors are interchangeable so that entries
of matrix A outside the main diagonal are ordered, following (12).
We assume that matrix entries a11 and a22 are fixed, and depict in Figure 5 any
arbitrary matrix A satisfying (12), depending on matrix entries a12 and a21. Notice
that conditions (12) force the range of variables a12 and a21 to belong to the triangle
with vertices A,B and C in Figure 5.
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B = (a11+a222 ,
a11+a22
2 )
C = (a11 +a22,0)
D = (a222 ,0)
E = (a222 ,
a22
2 )
F = (a11− a222 ,
a22
2 )
G = (a11− a222 ,0)
H = (a11,a22)
Figure 5: The regions for families with the same nucleolus
Now whenever we have a matrix A with the normalization conditions (12) we
depict it in the above Figure 5. In this way we easily describe the family [A]ν . The
analysis is divided in three regions.
Region 1: Matrix A belongs to triangle ADE or segment EB. All these matrices
share the same nucleolus, precisely the equal division between optimal matched
pairs. This region corresponds to the symmetric case, a12 = a21, and matrices
where a12 and a21 are “small” with respect the optimal entries: a21 ≤ a12 ≤ a222 .
Notice because of the normalization conditions, we have a symmetric region out-
side triangle ABC with the same nucleolus. Therefore the family is composed of a
square and a segment, see e.g. Figure 3. Outside this region the family is composed
of two segments.
Region 2: Matrix A belongs to the region limited by D,E,B,H,F,G. In this
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case, a generic family is given in Figure 5 by segments [X ,Y ]∪ [Y,Z]. One of them,
the vertical one [X ,Y ], increases entry a21 from zero up to a222 and the other [Y,Z]
has a 45◦ slope.
Region 3: Matrix A belongs to the region limited by G,F,H,C. In this case, a
generic family is given in Figure 5 by segments [X ′,Y ′]∪ [Y ′,Z′]. One of them, the
vertical one [X ′,Y ′], increases smaller entry a21 from zero up to the straight line
FC with equation a12 +3a21 = a11 +a22 and the other [Y ′,Z′] has a 45◦ slope.
Matrices given by points Z or Z′, on the segment [B,C] in Figure 5, correspond
with the unique valuation matrix A of each family [A]ν . Recall that in general there
are two branches of each family, depending on the chosen optimal matching of A.
In Table 1 we show buyers’ coordinates of the nucleolus of an assignment
matrix satisfying the normalization conditions (12). In it we denote by dA the
difference between the main diagonal and the secondary diagonal, i.e. dA = a11 +
a22−a12−a21. Recall that the whole nucleolus ν(A) = (u∗1,u∗2;v∗1,v∗2) is obtained
by v∗i = aii− u∗i for i = 1,2. A proof of the facts given in Table 1 can be checked
in Martı́nez-de-Albéniz et al. (2013a), computed under the previous normalization
conditions (12).
The above formulas for the nucleolus allow us to obtain the valuation matrix
of the family, given by (11). Then once reached matrix A to describe the whole
family [A]ν we have to repeat the analysis rearranging conveniently the entries of
A, now for the other optimal matching, given by the secondary diagonal.
6. About the cardinality of the family
The family of matrices with the same nucleolus is not in general a convex set.
To see it just consider appropriate matrices of Example 3.1 and their midpoint, but
as the reader must suspect, there is a path linking any two matrices of the family,
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} a21 ≥ a12 +a22−a11 a112 + a122 − a212 a222







maybe passing through its maximum.
Now we prove an interesting property. There is a continuous piecewise linear
path (maybe not unique) between any matrix in [A]ν and its maximum element A.
From here it is clear that the family [A]ν is a path-connected set.
Theorem 6.1. Let A ∈M+m×m′ be an assignment matrix, and A ∈ [A]ν the maximal
element of the family. Then for any B ∈ [A]ν there exists an increasing piecewise
linear path7 from B to A inside [A]ν . As a consequence, the family [A]ν is a path-
connected set. In particular, for any B ∈ [A]ν ,B 6= A, there exists C ∈ [A]ν with
7 A path in X ⊆M+m×m′ from A to B, A,B ∈X , is a continuous function f from the unit interval
I = [0,1] to X , i.e. f : [0,1]→X , with f (0) = A and f (1) = B. Moreover a subset X ⊆M+m×m′ is
path-connected if for any two elements A,B ∈X there exists a path from A to B entirely contained
in X .
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B <C < A.8
Proof. First we analyze the square case, m = m′. We can assume |M| = |M′| ≥
2. Let it be B ∈ [A]ν , and ν(A) = ν(B) = (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×RM
′
+ . Let us define the
set formed by the distances that appear in the geometric characterization of the





S,T (x,y) |S⊆M,T ⊆M′, |S|= |T |,S 6= /0,M, and T 6= /0,M′
}
.
These elements are used for the characterization of the nucleolus and correspond to
the minimum of some numbers. The elements of ∆(B) can be ordered increasingly:
0 = δ B0 < δ
B
1 < .. . < δ
B
r∗ ,
and then ∆(B) = {δ B0 ,δ B1 , . . . ,δ Br∗}.
From these parameters we can define a new matrix B0 with the same nucleolus.
We set b0i j = bi j if xi + y j−bi j ∈ ∆(B), and we raise the worth of entry bi j to b0i j in
such a way that xi + y j−b0i j equals the closest one-below element of ∆(B), that is,
if δ Bk < xi + y j−bi j < δ Bk+1 for some k, then b0i j = xi + y j−δ Bk .
It is clear that matrix B0 has the same nucleolus as matrix B since the equalities
of the geometric characterization of the nucleolus haven’t changed and therefore
B0 ∈ [A]ν . Moreover ∆(B) = ∆(B0). We may choose increasing linear paths from B
to B0, one for each entry to raise. Notice that since we are moving up the entries that
do not determine the distances of ∆(B), all matrices on these paths will preserve
the original nucleolus.
Now we have a matrix B0 ∈ [A]ν such that xi + y j−b0i j ∈ ∆(B0) for all (i, j) ∈
M×M′. Moreover if δ B0S,T (x,y) = δ Br∗ , for some S⊂M and T ⊂M
′ with |S|= |T | 6=
8 If B,C ∈M+m×m′ , B <C if and only if B≤C and B 6=C.
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m, then we have, for all i ∈ S and j /∈ T, xi + y j−b0i j = δ Br∗ . We finish the proof in
the square case by raising the entries of matrix B0 iteratively up to get A.
Firstly, notice that if r∗ = 0, that is ∆(B) = ∆(B0) = {0}. Then matrix B0 co-
incides with the valuation matrix of the family A since then xi + y j = b0j for all
(i, j) ∈M×M′, see (11) and recall m = m′.
Otherwise, r∗ > 0. In this case, for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ such that xi + y j−b0i j =
δ B
0
r∗ raise linearly and simultaneously b
0
i j to b
1
i j defined by the equality xi + y j −
b1i j = δ
B0
r∗−1. We obtain a new matrix B
1 ∈ [A]ν , defined for all i ∈M and j ∈M′ by
b1i j =
 xi + y j−δ B
0
r∗−1 if xi + y j−b
0




It is easy to see that ∆(B1) ⊆ ∆(B0), and ∆(B1) 6= ∆(B0). This means we have
reduced the set of distances related with the nucleolus. Once again by (3) it is easy
to see that ν(B1) = (x,y) or equivalently B1 ∈ [A]ν .
Now, in a finite number of steps, proceed sequentially raising all entries until
for all (i, j) ∈M×M′ we have xi + y j−br∗i j = 0. That is, matrix Br∗ coincides with
matrix A for the square case. In it all matchings are optimal.
For the non-square case, we assume |M| < |M′| . Let B ∈ [A]ν , and let µ ∈
M ∗B (M,M
′) be an optimal matching.
Notice first that matrix B can be modified without changing its nucleolus in the
following way:






(ii) for all (i, j) ∈M× (M′ \µ(M)) raise entries bi j to bµi , and we do not modify
the rest of entries.
This new matrix, denoted by B̃ has the same nucleolus and then B̃ ∈ [A]ν .
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Indeed, matrix B̃ has also µ as an optimal matching and then by definition it has
the same same square matrix Bµ ∈ M+m , i.e. (B̃)µ = Bµ , see (7). It is easy to see
that the relationships between matrices B̃ and (B̃)µ are
b̃µi j = b̃i j−b
µ
i for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M). (13)




= ν (B) = (x,y) ∈ RM+ ×




= (x′,y′) ∈RM+ ×R
µ(M)




i for i ∈M,
and y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M).
We can apply the previous procedure for square matrices to obtain an increas-
ing piecewise linear path from (B̃)µ to its maximum matrix in [(B̃)µ ]ν . This path,
applied to matrix B̃M×µ(M), see (13), induces a path from B̃M×µ(M) to AM×µ(M),
where A denotes the maximum element of the family [A]ν .





























is, for i∗ ∈ M we have ai∗ j = b
µ
i∗ for all j ∈ M
′ \ µ(M). For any i 6= i∗, i ∈ M
such that x′i > mini∈M













, we can raise at the same time entries b̃i j = b
µ
i to





for all j ∈M′ \µ(M) without changing the nucleolus, as the
reader can check applying (8) and (9). This ends the proof.
There is a continuum of elements in any family [A]ν , A ∈M+m , except for the











 , k > 0.
In these special cases the family [A]ν reduces to a singleton. The null case is
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obvious and the case m = 2 is checked easily from the description of the family in
the 2×2 case.
In the case m≥ 3, notice that if matrix A ∈M+m is not the maximum element of
the family Theorem 6.1 gives a continuum of elements of the family. It only rests
to analyze the case A = A. In this case we know, since we are in the square case,
that xi+y j = ai j for all (i, j) ∈M×M′, where ν(A) = (x,y). Clearly all matchings
are optimal. In this case let ai∗ j∗ be an arbitrary positive entry of matrix A. It exists
since we are not in the null case. Define matrix B ∈M+m by lowering this entry to
zero, i.e.
bi j =
 ai j if (i, j) 6= (i∗, j∗),0 if (i, j) = (i∗, j∗).
We leave some details to the reader to check that matrix B ∈ [A]ν and B 6= A by
using (3). Once again by Theorem 6.1 the continuum of elements of [A]ν is guar-
anteed.
7. The inverse problem
In this section we study the conditions to ensure that a given vector is the
nucleolus of some assignment game.
Firstly notice that not any vector is a candidate to be a nucleolus. For instance,
the vector (3,2,1,4)∈R2+×R2+ can never be the nucleolus of any 2×2 assignment
game. For any candidate (x,y) ∈RM+ ×RM
′
+ with |M|= |M′|, to be the nucleolus of
an assignment game with matrix A ∈M+m , by (3) it must satisfy
δ
A






= δ AM′,M (x,y) . (14)
In our case min{x1,x2}= 2 6= 1 = min{y1,y2} .
Moreover, let us see that condition (14) turns out to be a simple characterization
of it. To see the characterization, just define the square matrix V = (vi j)1≤i, j≤m
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. Indeed, any matching is optimal in V and the vector
(x,y)∈C(wV ). Therefore δVS,T (x,y) = δVT,S (x,y) = 0 for all /0 6= S⊆M and /0 6= T ⊆
M′ with |S|= |T |, and S 6= M. Moreover δVM,M′ (x,y) = δ
V
M′,M (x,y) by assumption.
Hence we have ν (V ) = (x,y). Summarizing we have the following result.
Theorem 7.1 (Condition for the nucleolus in the square case). Let (x,y)∈RM+×
RM′+ be a vector, with |M|= |M′|. The following statements are equivalent:









To analyze the non-square case we use the approach given in (8) and (9). Since
it is well known that the nucleolus of a non-square assignment game gives zero
payoff to all non-optimally assigned players, then a candidate vector must assign
zero to some players. The next result is the precise necessary and sufficient condi-
tion. Its proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 7.2 (Condition for the nucleolus in the non-square case). Let (x,y) ∈
RM+ ×RM
′
+ be a vector, with |M| < |M′|, and let Z0 =
{
j ∈M′ | y j = 0
}
. The fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a matrix A ∈M+m×m′ , such that ν(A) = (x,y),









Notice that from Theorem 7.1 and 7.2, the vector (3,2,1,4) ∈ R2+×R2+ can
never be the nucleolus of any 2×2 assignment game, but the vector (3,2,1,4,0) ∈
R2+×R3+ is the nucleolus of some assignment game. Indeed, matrix V =
 2 7 2
3 5 1

has the desired nucleolus.
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8. Appendix
Proof of (8) and (9)
Proof. Let A∈M+m×m′ ,m<m
′ and let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) . Without loss of generality,
we can assume that µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal matching of matrix
A.
We first prove that matching µ is also an optimal matching of matrix Aµ , de-
fined by (6) and (7). To see it, consider any allocation (x,y) ∈ C(wA). Clearly





for all i∈M. Then, as xi−aµi ≥ 0 for all i∈M, we obtain
(xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ 0, for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M). Moreover, for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M),
we also have (xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ ai j−a
µ
i . From both inequalities we have
(xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ a
µ
i j for all (i, j) ∈M×µ(M).
Since µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} is an optimal matching for A, then aii ≥ aµi




ii , for all i ∈M.
Now we can prove that µ is also optimal for matrix Aµ . To see it for any other








(xi−aµi )+ yi = ∑
(i, j)∈µ ′
(xi−aµi )+ y j ≥ ∑
(i, j)∈µ ′
aµi j.
Let A0,M0 and µ0 the notation introduced in (5) to make square the non-square
initial matrix A. We know that matching µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is opti-





For each vector (x,y)∈RM+×RM
′







defined by x0k = xk if k ∈ M and x0k = 0 if k ∈ M0\M and y0k = yk if k ∈ M′. It is




∈C (wA0) . Moreover
(x,y) ∈C(wA) if and only if (x′,y′) ∈C (wAµ ) , where x′i = xi− a
µ
i for i ∈M, and
y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M). The proof of these facts is left to the reader.
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Let us denote ν (A) = (x,y). We have to show ν (Aµ) = (x′,y′). To this end, take
µ = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m,m)} an optimal matching of A, and also of Aµ . Recall
that µ0 = {(1,1),(2,2), . . . ,(m′,m′)} is optimal for A0.














































































where the second equality comes from the fact that for all j ∈M′ \µ(M) we have
y j = 0, the third equality since for all i∈ S, xi≥ xi−aµi and the fifth one comes from
the fact that whenever ai j−aµi < 0 we have (xi−a
µ





which allows us to introduce the term aµi j.
We finish the proof by recalling that ν(A0) = (x0,y0).
Proof of Theorem 7.2
Proof. 1. −→ 2. Let A ∈M+m×m′ ,m < m
′ be a matrix and let ν (A) = (x,y) be its
nucleolus.
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Let µ ∈M ∗A (M,M′) be an optimal matching. Clearly, non-assigned sellers by
µ get zero payoffs in the nucleolus. Therefore, let Z′0 be the set of non-assigned
sellers by µ, i.e. Z′0 = M
′ \µ(M).
Now apply (8) and (9) and ν (Aµ) = (x′,y′), with x′i = xi− a
µ
i for i ∈ M, and




i∈M and matrix A
µ are defined as in













This is condition 2.
2. −→ 1. We define matrix V ∈M+m×m′ by
vi j :=







if i ∈M, and j ∈ Z′0.
Note that any matching between M and M′\Z′0 is optimal for V, i.e. M (M,M′ \Z′0)⊆
M ∗V (M,M
′) . This matrix V ∈M+m×m′ is, in fact, a valuation matrix and its proof is
left to the reader.
We must prove now that vector (x,y) is the nucleolus of this matrix V. From (8)
and (9), (x,y) = ν (V ) if and only if ν (V µ) = (x′,y′), with x′i = xi− v
µ
i for i ∈M,
and y′j = y j for j ∈ µ(M), for some µ ∈M (M,M′ \Z′0) . Indeed, all of them are
optimal.










for all i ∈M. By its definition and the above equalities matrix V µ satisfies, for all
(i, j) ∈M× (M′ \Z′0),
vµi j = max
{



























and V µ is a square valuation
matrix, by (3) we obtain ν (V µ) = (x′,y′).
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